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Speaking on the BBC Radio 4 programme Great Lives in 2007, the British general Sir 
Michael Rose – who had chosen George Washington as his historical exemplar – claimed 
that the British lost America because they did not understand the war they were fighting. It 
is one of the central arguments of Andrew O'Shaughnessy's study that this was not the 
case. Contrary to the traditional image of the British military as hidebound aristocrats and 
their political leadership as reactionary and inept, the men who commanded the Empire's 
forces throughout what was to become a global war were seasoned professionals who 
rapidly learned to respect their opponents and who, at least as far as the military men were 
concerned, were often opposed to the coercive policies that had provoked the Revolution. 
 
As the leading military and financial power of the age, Great Britain might have been 
expected to defeat the rebels without much difficulty. O'Shaughnessy's book carefully and 
persuasively shows why she did not. But this is not simply another military history of the 
War of Independence, this time from the ‘other’ side. Instead the author seeks to examine 
the strengths and weaknesses of the whole British command system in order to set the 
American war in its proper context, that of a worldwide struggle with the rival powers of 
France and Spain for the future of the Empire. He does this through a series of 
biographical studies of the leading figures: the politicians (George III and Lord North); the 
military commanders (the Howes, Burgoyne, Clinton, Cornwallis and Rodney); and those 
who, as war ministers, were both (Germain and Sandwich). Although this approach 
necessarily leads to a degree of repetition, it does serve to demonstrate the close 
interrelationship between military and political factors that most histories of the Revolution, 
dealing with one or the other, overlook. 
 
The British military commanders in America were a professional caste, selected for their 
commands on merit rather than seniority, who invested in the training and exercise of their 
men, understood the principles of strategic planning and operational intelligence and were 
personally courageous. They largely respected their American opposite numbers and 
adapted rapidly to American conditions, particularly in their use of light infantry. Several, 
such as Howe and Burgoyne, had been MPs as well as professional soldiers and 
understood the war's political context: both opposed it or were ambivalent (despite 
supporting imperial rule) before being selected for command. Both returned claiming the 
war was unwinnable (because the Americans were adamant for independence). Nor were 
the politicians ignorant of military affairs: Germain, for example, had held military 
command prior to becoming Secretary of State for America. 
 
However, if the British commanders are shown to have been competent, often the 
government is not, for it resolutely pursued an increasingly unworkable strategy that 
overestimated the extent of loyalism in the colonies and discounted (or simply did not 
understand) the Americans’ revolutionary politics. The strategic challenge of re‐conquering 
America was too great for an eighteenth‐century war machine (especially one with such a 
decentralised administrative system), and O'Shaughnessy even claims that the outcome 
was all but decided in the four months before the Declaration of Independence. The 
Americans were free from the moment they refused to accept the sovereignty of the 
crown, the onus being on the mother country to re‐establish her authority. Given the 
advantages of defence the rebels enjoyed, and their often overwhelming numerical 
superiority, this was always going to be a tall order. The French entry into the war in 1778 
dramatically changed the strategic balance, not only in America but also in Europe, as the 
government now had to contend with the threat of an invasion of the British Isles 
themselves. 
 
This is not a conventional military history of the war, still less a political one, and the reader 
does not learn much in any systematic way about the mechanics of parliamentary 
government or party politics in the 1770s, or even about the general state of Great Britain 
or the British Empire. The French intervention is discussed mostly in terms of the British 
view of it, and the treatment of the Native American role in the war is brief. Nevertheless, 
what O'Shaughnessy does have to say on any of these subjects is pertinent. Above all, he 
succeeds in setting the American war in its wider context, giving due weight to operations 
in Canada and particularly in the Caribbean (the subject of the author's previous book), 
which was so important to Britain's commerce that at several points after 1778 the 
government accorded the war there priority over the North American theatre. If there is a 
common theme to O'Shaughnessy's analysis, it might be how the British Empire was 
nearly defeated by ‘imperial overstretch’: time and again he shows how supporting the 
army at such a distance was an almost impossible logistical challenge as London 
struggled to balance so many competing priorities. That the Empire survived at all was due 
to the professionalism and experience of its leadership. 
 
Given that the book is clearly written for an American audience (O'Shaughnessy, a Briton, 
currently teaches at the University of Virginia), it is perhaps surprising that its author does 
not make explicit the parallel with the American experience in Vietnam. Nevertheless, the 
judgements are consistently sound, and students in particular will welcome the substantial 
endnotes and bibliography. Histories of conflicts are often written by the victors, but, as 
O'Shaughnessy notes (p.9), a ‘British perspective is essential for making the war 
intelligible’. In this he has succeeded admirably. 
